ALL 36 STATE ASSEMBLIES APPROVE STATE POLICE BILL AS NIGERIA MOVES CLOSER TO HISTORIC SECURITY OVERHAUL

All 36 State Houses of Assembly have approved Nigeria’s proposed constitutional amendment establishing state police services, going well beyond the minimum 24-state threshold required under Section 9 of the 1999 Constitution and clearing the way for the National Assembly to transmit the measure to President Bola Tinubu for assent. The reform would create a constitutional basis for states to establish their own police services alongside the federal Nigeria Police Force, reflecting growing political consensus that localized threats including kidnapping, banditry, terrorism and communal violence require a more decentralized security response. Tinubu has publicly supported state policing, but the next phase will require detailed safeguards covering funding, recruitment, oversight, jurisdiction, election security and protection against political abuse if the historic restructuring of Nigeria’s policing system is to deliver improved security rather than simply additional institutions.
ABUJA, NIGERIA — Nigeria has moved significantly closer to one of the most far-reaching changes in its internal security structure since the return to civilian rule, after all 36 State Houses of Assembly approved the constitutional amendment seeking to establish state police services across the federation. The development clears a major constitutional hurdle and places the measure on course for transmission to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu for assent, potentially opening the way for a policing system in which states can establish and operate their own police services alongside the existing Nigeria Police Force. The amendment has been driven by years of concern over terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, communal violence, urban crime and the inability of a centrally controlled police structure to respond quickly and effectively to security threats that vary widely from one state to another.
The constitutional threshold was technically satisfied before all 36 states completed their consideration. Under Section 9 of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, an alteration of this nature requires approval by at least two-thirds of the State Houses of Assembly, meaning a minimum of 24 states. The Clerk to the National Assembly, Kamoru Ogunlana, announced on November 3 that 28 states had already approved the bill, exceeding the constitutional requirement, while Senate Leader Opeyemi Bamidele later disclosed that the number had risen further and gave remaining states additional time to communicate their positions before the measure was sent forward. By November 16, the process had reached unanimous state-level approval, transforming what began as a controversial constitutional proposal into a reform now backed by every state legislature in the federation.
The bill was transmitted to the 36 State Houses of Assembly on September 16 for consideration after passage through the National Assembly, with the states originally asked to communicate their decisions within 30 days. The initial deadline expired on October 15, but the Office of the Clerk said it would continue receiving responses until formal transmission for presidential assent. The National Assembly also said it had verified the votes and proceedings submitted by the states to ensure that the approvals accurately reflected decisions taken by the respective legislatures, an important administrative safeguard because constitutional alterations require more than informal political support; they depend on properly documented legislative approval.
The unanimity of the state assemblies is politically significant because state policing has been one of Nigeria’s longest-running and most divisive constitutional debates. Successive governments, governors, security experts and civil society groups have argued over whether the country’s centralized police system can effectively secure a federation of more than 200 million people spread across 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Supporters of decentralization have long argued that governors are described constitutionally as chief security officers of their states but have limited direct operational authority over the police commands responsible for maintaining public order within those same territories. The proposed reform is intended to address that contradiction by giving states a formal policing structure capable of responding to local threats, gathering intelligence within communities and operating with greater familiarity with local languages, terrain and criminal networks.
President Tinubu has become one of the strongest high-level supporters of state policing, repeatedly arguing that Nigeria’s changing security challenges require a more decentralized response. The administration has described state police as increasingly necessary because insecurity differs sharply across regions: banditry and mass kidnapping remain severe in parts of the North-West, insurgency and terrorism continue to affect the North-East, farmer-herder violence persists in parts of the Middle Belt, kidnapping and separatist-related violence have affected parts of the South-East, while urban crime, cult violence, oil theft and other security pressures take different forms across the South. A single federal command structure, supporters argue, can struggle to allocate personnel and intelligence efficiently across such a diverse security environment.
The argument for state police has gained additional momentum as Nigeria’s security challenges have become increasingly localized. State governments already spend large amounts supporting federal police commands with vehicles, buildings, communications equipment, fuel and other resources, while many states have created vigilante groups, neighborhood watches or regional security organizations to fill gaps left by overstretched federal agencies. Amotekun in the South-West, Hisbah structures in parts of the North, civilian joint task forces in the North-East and various state-backed vigilante services demonstrate that decentralized security arrangements already exist in practice, even though they do not possess the same constitutional status, investigative powers or institutional safeguards as formal police forces.
Supporters of the amendment therefore argue that constitutional state policing would bring such activity into a clearer legal framework. Properly structured state police services could recruit personnel familiar with local communities, develop intelligence networks closer to residents and respond more rapidly to emerging threats without waiting for authorization or reinforcement from distant federal structures. Governors and state legislatures would also potentially have greater responsibility for security outcomes within their territories, creating a clearer line of accountability between local political leadership and law-enforcement performance.
The reform, however, has always attracted serious concerns, particularly over the possibility that governors or dominant political parties could misuse state police against opponents. Critics have warned that without strong safeguards, a state-controlled police force could be used during elections to intimidate opposition parties, suppress protests, harass journalists or enforce the political interests of governors. Nigeria’s history of political violence and allegations of abuse by security agencies has made those fears particularly sensitive, and much of the constitutional debate has therefore focused not only on whether state police should exist but on how they would be governed, funded, supervised and restrained.
Those concerns help explain why lawmakers and security institutions have spent considerable time discussing oversight mechanisms. Earlier in 2026, senior National Assembly officials met with a Nigeria Police Force committee examining the state police framework, with lawmakers emphasizing the need to address public concerns about accountability and institutional design. Any sustainable system will likely require clear rules governing recruitment, command structures, disciplinary procedures, funding, inter-state operations, federal-state jurisdiction and the circumstances in which federal authorities can intervene when abuses are alleged.
The issue of funding may prove just as important as constitutional authority. Establishing professional police services in 36 states would require enormous and sustained expenditure on salaries, training, weapons, vehicles, communications systems, forensic facilities, intelligence infrastructure, barracks and pensions. Wealthier states such as Lagos, Rivers or states with stronger internally generated revenue may be better positioned to fund large security institutions than poorer states that already struggle to meet basic public-sector obligations. Without a strong national funding framework, critics fear that Nigeria could create a two-tier policing system in which some states maintain well-equipped forces while others operate underfunded services vulnerable to corruption and political manipulation.
That disparity could also raise questions about mobility and jurisdiction. Criminal networks frequently operate across state borders, particularly kidnapping gangs, arms traffickers, bandit groups and organized crime syndicates. A workable state police structure would therefore need mechanisms allowing forces in different states to share intelligence and conduct joint operations without creating confusion over command. The federal Nigeria Police Force, Department of State Services, military and other national security agencies would also need clearly defined relationships with state police services to prevent duplication or jurisdictional disputes.
The proposed amendment is therefore only the constitutional foundation of a much larger institutional project. Presidential assent would establish the legal basis for state policing, but detailed laws and regulations would still be needed to determine how individual state police services are created and how they operate. State legislatures would likely have important roles in establishing their respective services, approving funding and creating local oversight structures, while federal legislation and constitutional provisions would need to protect minimum national standards.
Another major issue will be recruitment. Advocates of state police frequently argue that officers should be recruited largely from the communities they serve because local knowledge can improve intelligence gathering and public trust. Officers who understand local languages, customs, roads and community networks may be better positioned to identify suspicious activity and resolve disputes before they escalate. At the same time, recruitment systems would need to prevent ethnic, religious or political discrimination and ensure that state forces do not become armed extensions of dominant local groups.
Training standards will also be critical. Nigeria already faces persistent concerns about police professionalism, human rights abuses, extortion and weak investigative capacity. Creating 36 additional policing systems without addressing those wider institutional problems could decentralize existing weaknesses rather than solve them. Reform advocates therefore argue that state police must be accompanied by stronger training, professional standards, independent complaints procedures, modern forensic capacity and enforceable protections against torture, arbitrary detention and corruption.
The National Assembly’s handling of the bill also carries broader constitutional significance. The Office of the Clerk specifically noted earlier this month that Section 9 does not expressly require the same third-reading procedure for a constitutional alteration bill that applies to ordinary legislation after state approval. Instead, once the constitutional threshold among state assemblies has been satisfied and the documentation verified, the administrative process moves toward presidential assent. The House of Representatives’ official proceedings on November 4 recorded communication from the Clerk regarding state approvals and the leadership’s direction that the bill be transmitted to the President.
That procedural clarification matters because public discussion of constitutional amendments can sometimes create confusion about whether the entire National Assembly process must restart after state legislatures vote. In this case, the National Assembly has treated the state approvals as the final major legislative hurdle before transmission to Tinubu. The fact that all 36 state legislatures have now supported the amendment gives the measure political legitimacy significantly beyond the minimum constitutional requirement, even though unanimous approval does not eliminate the need for careful implementation.
The coming presidential decision is unlikely to be politically surprising because Tinubu has publicly supported state police, but assent would still be historically significant. Nigeria has operated under a highly centralized policing model for decades, and a constitutional shift toward state-controlled services would redistribute substantial power within the federation. It could alter the relationship between governors and federal security agencies, reshape state budgets and fundamentally change how Nigerians experience law enforcement at community level.
The reform also comes at a time when public frustration over insecurity remains intense. Kidnappings for ransom, attacks on rural communities, banditry, terrorism and violent crime have remained major political and economic issues, disrupting farming, transportation, schooling and investment in many parts of the country. Security forces have recorded important operations against armed groups, but the persistence of attacks has reinforced arguments that Nigeria requires policing structures closer to the communities where crimes occur.
State policing, however, will not automatically solve those problems. The effectiveness of the reform will depend on whether new forces are professional, adequately funded and insulated from partisan control. A poorly designed state police service could create additional security institutions without improving public safety, while a carefully regulated system could strengthen intelligence, improve response times and give communities a greater role in policing.
Political safeguards will therefore remain central even after presidential assent. Independent state police commissions, transparent recruitment systems, judicial oversight, federal constitutional protections and clear disciplinary mechanisms could help reduce the danger of abuse. Civil society organizations are also likely to demand strong provisions ensuring that officers cannot be deployed simply because a governor wants to suppress political opposition or peaceful protest.
Election security will be one of the most closely watched areas. Nigeria’s elections already involve extensive police deployment, and creating forces accountable partly to state governments could raise concerns in contests where governors have direct political interests. Clear rules will be needed determining which agency controls election security and how state police interact with federal forces during national and state elections.
The reform could also change Nigeria’s federal balance more broadly. Governors have long demanded greater authority over security, arguing that true federalism should allow constituent states greater responsibility for maintaining public order. Critics of excessive decentralization, however, warn that Nigeria’s history of regional conflict makes security powers particularly sensitive. The final framework will therefore need to balance local autonomy with national cohesion.
The unanimous state approval indicates that governors and legislators across party lines increasingly believe the risks of the current centralized system outweigh the risks of reform. That consensus is striking because state policing was once an issue that sharply divided Nigeria’s political class. The deterioration and diversification of security threats over the past decade appear to have shifted the debate from whether decentralization should happen toward how it should be structured safely.
The federal Nigeria Police Force will also remain central after any reform. State police are not expected simply to replace the existing national force. Nigeria would instead move toward a multi-level policing structure in which federal officers retain responsibility for federal offenses, national security matters, inter-state crime and other specified functions, while state services concentrate more heavily on crimes and public-order issues within their jurisdictions.
Designing that division will require precision. Overlapping authority can create competition between agencies, while gaps in responsibility can allow criminals to exploit jurisdictional boundaries. Strong communications systems and shared intelligence databases will therefore be essential if the new structure is to improve coordination rather than fragment it.
The financial implications may eventually become one of the largest debates surrounding implementation. Personnel costs alone could be substantial, particularly if states recruit tens of thousands of new officers. Governments will need to decide whether states fund their forces entirely from their own revenues or whether a national funding mechanism will provide support to poorer states. Any shared funding arrangement will also raise questions about whether federal financial contributions should give Abuja additional oversight powers.
Those debates will intensify after assent because constitutional authorization is only the beginning of institutional creation. Each state will need to determine whether it is ready to establish a police service immediately and what model it can afford. It is possible that implementation will occur at different speeds, with some states moving quickly while others require more time to build funding, training and oversight structures.
For President Tinubu, signing the amendment would fulfill one of the most consequential security reforms associated with his administration. He has repeatedly argued that Nigeria must adapt its security architecture to contemporary threats and has publicly supported decentralized policing. The unanimous state-level approval now gives him a bill backed not merely by the constitutional minimum but by every state legislature in the country.
For the National Assembly, the vote represents the culmination of a lengthy constitutional review process involving both chambers and state legislatures. Lawmakers have described state police as part of a wider effort to strengthen federalism and create security institutions more responsive to local conditions. The House has also hosted national dialogue on state policing, reflecting the degree to which lawmakers have attempted to bring governors, police leaders, civil society and other stakeholders into the debate.
The unanimity achieved across the 36 state assemblies will now shift attention away from whether Nigeria should constitutionally permit state police and toward the much harder question of what those forces should actually look like. Nigeria must determine who appoints commissioners, how officers are disciplined, what independent oversight exists, how abuses are investigated, how forces are funded and how state commands coordinate with federal agencies during national emergencies.
Those decisions will ultimately determine whether the reform improves public safety or simply creates another layer of security bureaucracy. The constitutional amendment can create the institution, but it cannot by itself guarantee professionalism, fairness or effectiveness.
Nigeria is therefore approaching a historic turning point in its policing system. With every State House of Assembly now supporting the amendment and the constitutional threshold comfortably exceeded, the bill is moving toward President Tinubu at a moment when insecurity remains one of the country’s most serious national challenges. If assent follows as expected, the focus will immediately shift from constitutional politics to implementation, where the success or failure of state policing will depend on the safeguards, resources and institutions built around the new powers.
The significance of the moment lies in the scale of the change being contemplated. For decades, responsibility for formal policing has been concentrated overwhelmingly at the federal level. Nigeria is now preparing for a system in which states may exercise direct constitutional authority over police services of their own. That could make security more responsive to local realities, but it will also give governors and state institutions powers they have never previously possessed under the current constitutional order.
How Nigeria manages that new authority will determine whether state police become a major instrument for improving security or another source of political controversy. The unanimous approvals show that the political consensus for change has now been established. The next and more difficult task is ensuring that the structure created in response is professional enough to protect communities, accountable enough to prevent abuse and coordinated enough to strengthen rather than fragment Nigeria’s national security system.


