GERMANY GIVES INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SWEEPING NEW POWERS TO HACK AND DISRUPT ADVERSARIES

BERLIN — Germany’s parliament has approved one of the most far-reaching expansions of intelligence powers in the country’s postwar history, authorizing federal spy agencies to move beyond gathering information and, under tightly defined conditions, actively hack, disrupt, deceive and disable adversaries threatening the country. The Bundestag approved the intelligence reform on Friday, November 13, after months of debate over how Germany should respond to intensifying espionage, cyberattacks, sabotage and other forms of hybrid warfare, particularly threats the government says are linked to hostile foreign states. The legislation significantly expands the powers of the Federal Intelligence Service, known as the BND, and the domestic Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, or BfV, while creating new safeguards intended to prevent the agencies from exercising the kind of unchecked authority that remains deeply sensitive in Germany because of the country’s experience under the Nazi Gestapo and East Germany’s Stasi.

According to the official Bundestag record, 308 lawmakers voted for the legislation, 190 opposed it and 71 abstained. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s governing Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union alliance supported the measure together with the Social Democrats, while the Alternative for Germany and the Left Party opposed it and the Greens abstained. Some media reports initially listed 309 votes in favor, but the Bundestag’s published account gives the final figure as 308. The scale of the reform prompted Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt to describe it during the parliamentary debate as a “reform of the century,” arguing that Germany’s intelligence services could no longer remain limited largely to observing threats at a time when adversaries were using cyber operations, sabotage, espionage and disinformation to target the country.

Under the new framework, the BND, which is responsible for foreign intelligence, will be permitted in certain circumstances to interfere directly with hostile infrastructure abroad rather than merely identifying and reporting it. The agency may be authorized to disable servers used by state-backed hackers, manipulate or delete data, disrupt technological infrastructure and interfere with systems supporting hostile operations against Germany. During the earlier cabinet presentation of the legislation, government officials gave examples including the possibility of sabotaging drone factories or chemical weapons laboratories, disrupting the supply chains of hostile actors or taking servers used by foreign cyber groups offline. Those examples were presented as illustrations of what could become legally possible rather than confirmation that specific operations had already been approved or conducted.

The law does not give German intelligence services an unrestricted license to launch offensive operations abroad. For the BND to use its most intrusive powers, the agency must meet legal thresholds tied to an immediate danger to Germany or a persistent and systematic threat from a foreign power. The government says interventions must be directed at the responsible state or hostile infrastructure rather than designed to injure individuals, and physical force against people remains explicitly excluded. Measures are also expected to be used outside Germany where that would achieve the same objective, reflecting the distinction between foreign intelligence operations and domestic law enforcement.

The BfV, Germany’s domestic intelligence service, will receive a different but still substantial expansion of authority. The agency has traditionally concentrated on collecting intelligence about extremism, espionage and threats to the constitutional order while leaving arrests, raids and other coercive interventions to police. Under the new legislation, however, the BfV will be able to take technical action in exceptional circumstances when authorities believe an extreme threat requires immediate intervention and another agency cannot effectively act. That could include rerouting data traffic, interfering with an attacker’s communications, deleting stolen information from a hostile server or corrupting data stored for use in an attack.

The domestic agency will also gain the ability under specified circumstances to secretly enter premises and interfere with weapons or explosives linked to a serious threat. The legislation allows forms of deception, including feeding false information into hostile networks, a power that has drawn particular attention because it moves the BfV further from passive intelligence collection toward direct operational disruption. Police will retain responsibility for arrests, public searches and other conventional law enforcement measures, meaning the intelligence service will not simply become a parallel police force, but critics argue that the boundary between intelligence gathering and intervention has nevertheless been substantially altered.

The government says the changes are necessary because intelligence agencies have sometimes been able to identify an attack or hostile operation without possessing the legal authority to stop it themselves. In its explanation of the reform, the federal government said the existing system could create situations in which intelligence officers saw a threat developing but had to wait for another authority to intervene, even when that authority was unavailable or lacked jurisdiction. Dobrindt argued that such restrictions were increasingly unrealistic as hostile states and non-state actors use cyber tools capable of causing damage within minutes or seconds.

Germany’s security establishment has become increasingly focused on what officials describe as hybrid threats, a broad category that can include cyberattacks, disinformation, espionage, sabotage, covert political influence and attacks on infrastructure conducted below the threshold of conventional warfare. German officials have repeatedly accused Russia of carrying out or sponsoring such activities in Europe since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, while authorities have also raised concerns about espionage linked to China, Iran and other states. Those governments have denied or rejected various accusations made against them, and attribution in cyber and intelligence cases is often complex because operations can be routed through intermediaries or private actors.

The government has cited a sharp increase in suspected espionage and sabotage as part of the justification for the legislation. German authorities recorded hundreds of political and technological espionage cases in 2025, while intelligence chiefs have warned that foreign services are increasingly targeting government institutions, defense companies, research centers and critical infrastructure. German officials have also expressed concern about suspected Russian-linked sabotage operations, including alleged attempts to disrupt transport and logistics networks supporting Ukraine. Moscow has rejected accusations that it is conducting a campaign of sabotage against European countries.

The parliamentary vote came only months after a suspected plot targeting Leipzig-Halle Airport became part of the wider debate over hybrid threats. German authorities linked the case to Russia, saying investigators believed actors connected to Moscow had been involved in preparing an operation targeting aviation infrastructure. Russia has denied accusations of conducting covert sabotage operations in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. The case, together with repeated drone sightings near military installations and critical infrastructure, strengthened calls within the government for intelligence agencies to have greater authority to interfere before suspected hostile operations could be completed.

The law also expands surveillance and data-analysis powers. Germany’s intelligence services will have greater authority to monitor telecommunications and compare biometric information, although those powers remain subject to legal thresholds and oversight. Artificial intelligence and automated analytical systems may also be used more extensively to process intelligence data, but the law includes rules intended to prevent discriminatory automated decision-making and requires human oversight of certain machine-generated conclusions.

Those provisions reflect an attempt to address a broader dilemma confronting intelligence agencies worldwide. Modern security services collect enormous quantities of digital information, making automated systems increasingly important for identifying relationships, travel patterns and potential threats. At the same time, automated analysis can generate highly sensitive assessments of individual behavior, personality and movement, raising concerns about false positives, discriminatory profiling and opaque decision-making. Germany’s legislation attempts to regulate that process by requiring additional justification before particularly intrusive analytical products can be accessed and by subjecting some machine-generated outputs to human review.

Oversight has become one of the central issues in the debate because of Germany’s historical experience with state surveillance. The Nazi regime’s secret police and the East German Stasi used extensive networks of informants, surveillance and coercion to monitor and suppress political opposition. Modern German intelligence law was deliberately constructed with strong institutional and legal restraints to prevent the re-emergence of an unchecked secret police apparatus. Any proposal to give intelligence agencies broader operational powers therefore attracts scrutiny that goes beyond ordinary questions of security policy.

The government says the reforms preserve that separation by placing intrusive actions under judicial and parliamentary control. A strengthened independent oversight structure is expected to review particularly sensitive operations, including some measures before they are carried out. The legislation also implements requirements stemming from decisions by Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly ruled that surveillance powers must be proportionate to the level of intrusion involved and accompanied by meaningful safeguards.

That constitutional background is significant because the same legal system that prompted stronger protections for privacy also helped create the argument for reform. Germany’s highest court has previously reasoned that intelligence services could sometimes operate under lower legal thresholds than police partly because they lacked direct operational powers. By now giving agencies the authority to interfere with threats rather than simply observe them, lawmakers have had to establish more detailed restrictions governing when those powers may be used.

Civil liberties groups and opposition politicians remain unconvinced that the safeguards are sufficient. Critics argue that allowing intelligence officers to hack systems, enter premises secretly, manipulate communications or disseminate false information creates powers that could be abused if oversight weakens. The Left Party has warned that the reform blurs the traditional distinction between intelligence agencies and police, while other critics have questioned whether parliamentary and judicial supervision can realistically keep pace with fast-moving covert operations.

The Alternative for Germany also voted against the legislation, though its criticism has differed in emphasis from that of the Left. The AfD has argued in favor of greater national sovereignty and stronger intelligence capacity in some areas while criticizing elements of the government’s specific framework and oversight arrangements. The Greens abstained in the final vote, reflecting concerns about civil liberties and implementation while stopping short of joining the parties that rejected the package outright.

Supporters counter that Germany risks becoming dependent on foreign allies if its own intelligence agencies lack capabilities routinely used by services in countries such as the United States, Britain and France. German officials have acknowledged that legal restrictions and slow bureaucratic procedures have sometimes limited cooperation with partner agencies, particularly where other countries expected Germany to contribute intelligence or operational capabilities rather than merely receive information. Chancellor’s Office Minister Nina Warken argued when the government introduced the bill that Germany had relied too heavily in the past on partners to provide security capabilities it was unwilling or unable to develop itself.

Even with the new law, German intelligence agencies will remain more restricted than some of their closest allies. The legislation does not give the BND anything comparable to the paramilitary capabilities associated with parts of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency or France’s external intelligence service. Measures deliberately designed to endanger a person’s life or physical safety remain prohibited, and the agencies cannot simply conduct violent operations abroad under the new framework.

The legislation instead focuses heavily on cyber operations, technological disruption and covert interference with hostile infrastructure. That approach reflects the changing character of threats confronting European governments, where state adversaries may seek to weaken a country through attacks on communications networks, transportation, energy systems or digital services without launching a conventional military assault. The ability to disable a hostile server or corrupt equipment used in an attack could, in theory, allow Germany to respond without deploying military force.

Such operations can nevertheless carry international risks. A cyberattack aimed at disrupting foreign infrastructure can unintentionally affect civilian systems, cross national borders or trigger retaliation. Attribution can also be uncertain, meaning intelligence services must be confident they have correctly identified the actor behind an attack before responding. Those challenges are among the reasons the legislation requires formal assessments and higher approval thresholds for some operations.

Germany’s allies will closely watch how the new powers are used because the reform could make the country a more active participant in joint intelligence operations. For years, Germany has been one of Europe’s largest economic and political powers while maintaining a comparatively cautious security posture shaped by its history. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, expanding cyber threats and growing concerns about European defense have accelerated a broader shift under successive governments toward greater military and intelligence capacity.

The change has been particularly visible under Chancellor Merz, whose government has argued that Europe must become more capable of defending itself as international security becomes less predictable. Intelligence reform fits within that wider policy, alongside increased defense spending, stronger protection of critical infrastructure and efforts to improve Germany’s ability to respond to drone incursions and cyberattacks.

The new legislation also comes at a sensitive moment for the intelligence community itself. German agencies have faced criticism over past intelligence failures, slow information sharing and difficulty recruiting specialists with advanced cyber expertise. Expanding legal powers will therefore not automatically translate into stronger operational capabilities if agencies cannot recruit enough personnel or modernize their technology.

Cyber specialists are especially difficult for government agencies to attract because private technology companies often offer significantly higher salaries. Intelligence work also requires extensive security vetting and limits on public professional recognition, making recruitment more challenging. The BND and BfV will consequently need to expand technical expertise while simultaneously implementing a complicated new legal framework.

Another challenge will involve telecommunications and digital service providers, which can be required under the legislation to assist intelligence agencies in certain operations. Companies could face obligations to provide technical cooperation and may receive compensation for complying, while sanctions may be available where legally required assistance is refused. Such provisions are likely to generate further discussion over privacy, corporate responsibility and the extent to which private communications infrastructure should be integrated into national security operations.

The government argues that these mechanisms are essential because modern intelligence operations depend on networks largely owned and operated by private companies. Critics, however, fear that forcing service providers to assist covert operations could weaken trust in communications systems or create security vulnerabilities that could later be exploited by criminals or foreign intelligence services.

Germany will therefore enter the implementation phase with two competing pressures. Security officials will be under pressure to demonstrate that the new authority produces tangible improvements against espionage, sabotage and cyberattacks, while oversight bodies will face equally strong pressure to ensure that the agencies do not exceed their mandates. The success of the reform will depend heavily on how those institutions interpret terms such as immediate threat, persistent hostile activity and proportionality when approving real operations.

The legislation marks a significant change in the philosophy of German intelligence. For decades, the country’s postwar system emphasized collection, warning and restraint, with intervention generally left to police or military authorities. The new framework accepts that in the digital era, simply identifying a hostile operation may be insufficient if intelligence services cannot act quickly enough to disrupt it.

That shift is why supporters describe the law as historic and opponents view it with deep caution. Germany is attempting to strengthen intelligence capabilities at the same time as it preserves legal safeguards built out of some of the darkest experiences in its history. The tension between those objectives will not disappear simply because parliament has approved the legislation.

The immediate next stage will involve implementation, judicial oversight and the development of internal procedures governing when the new powers can be activated. Intelligence agencies will need to train personnel, establish approval systems and demonstrate that proposed operations meet statutory requirements, while parliament’s oversight structures will be expected to examine whether the expanded powers are being used proportionately.

Germany’s government believes the security environment has changed sufficiently to justify that transformation, arguing that foreign intelligence services, extremist networks and cyber operators already exploit the boundaries between espionage and direct action. Whether the new law makes Germany more secure without eroding the constitutional safeguards that have defined its postwar intelligence system will now depend less on the language passed by the Bundestag than on how the BND, BfV, courts and oversight institutions use and constrain the powers in practice.