NIGERIA’S FOREIGN ARMS DEPENDENCE IS PROLONGING INSECURITY, DEFENCE MINISTER WARNS

Nigeria’s Defence Minister, Maj. Gen. Christopher Musa (retd.), has warned that the country’s inability to manufacture enough of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment required by its security forces is contributing to the prolonged fight against terrorism, banditry and other forms of violent insecurity. Speaking at the University of Ibadan on Friday, Musa said Nigeria remains too dependent on foreign manufacturers at a time when wars and geopolitical instability are placing enormous pressure on the global defence supply chain, making even basic ammunition difficult to obtain quickly. He argued that Nigeria must now treat domestic defence production as a strategic national-security priority rather than continue relying predominantly on overseas suppliers whose equipment may not be immediately available when Nigerian troops need it most.

The minister made the remarks during the commissioning of the CG Musa Security Management Hub at the TETFund Centre of Excellence in Security Management at the University of Ibadan, Oyo State. He said the current security environment requires Nigeria to combine military operations with stronger institutions, technological innovation, informed policymaking and research capable of addressing the deeper causes of conflict. Musa told the gathering that the battlefield can reveal the immediate manifestations of insecurity, but universities and research institutions are needed to understand why conflicts persist, evaluate government responses and develop solutions that can last beyond individual military campaigns.

Musa’s most striking intervention concerned the availability of weapons and ammunition. He said Nigeria sometimes approaches international suppliers with the money required to make purchases but still cannot obtain equipment immediately because global demand has overwhelmed available stocks. According to the minister, ongoing international conflicts have created severe competition for military hardware, affecting the availability of items ranging from basic ammunition to Armoured Personnel Carriers. For a country simultaneously confronting insurgents, armed bandits, kidnappers, separatist violence, oil theft and other security threats across several regions, delays in replacing ammunition and equipment can have direct operational consequences.

The minister therefore called for Nigeria to substantially expand its domestic defence-industrial capacity so that the armed forces are not permanently vulnerable to decisions made by foreign manufacturers and governments. His argument is that a country facing persistent security threats should be able to manufacture a significant proportion of the ammunition, vehicles, protective systems and other equipment required by its troops instead of waiting for overseas suppliers every time stocks run low or new threats emerge.

Musa said the government wants to expose indigenous defence manufacturers to established international companies so that local firms can gain technology, technical expertise and manufacturing capacity. Rather than abandoning foreign partnerships, his preferred model appears to be one in which Nigeria uses those partnerships to build the capacity to manufacture more equipment domestically. Such cooperation could involve technology transfer, joint ventures, licensing, specialised training and local production of components that are currently imported.

The argument goes beyond national pride. Defence procurement operates differently from ordinary commercial purchasing because governments can impose export restrictions, licensing requirements and political conditions on sensitive military equipment. Even when a country has sufficient funds, an order can be delayed by production backlogs, geopolitical priorities, export approvals or competition from countries engaged in major wars. A domestic manufacturing base can reduce some of those vulnerabilities by ensuring that at least essential equipment and ammunition remain available locally.

Nigeria already possesses a domestic defence-production structure, but Musa’s remarks suggest that existing capacity remains insufficient for the scale of the country’s security requirements. For years, successive administrations have spoken about reducing dependence on imported military equipment, yet Nigerian forces continue to acquire substantial quantities of weapons, aircraft, armoured vehicles, surveillance systems and other hardware from foreign manufacturers. Building a larger domestic industry would require sustained investment, advanced engineering skills, strong quality controls, reliable supply chains and long-term procurement commitments from government.

The issue has become more urgent because Nigeria is fighting multiple categories of armed groups at the same time. In the northeast, security forces continue operations against Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province fighters. In the northwest and north-central regions, troops confront bandit networks, kidnappers and emerging extremist groups. Other parts of the country face communal violence, oil theft, organised crime and attacks on critical infrastructure. Each theatre places different demands on personnel, ammunition, surveillance equipment, vehicles and communications systems.

Musa acknowledged that military operations alone cannot resolve those challenges. He said insecurity is sustained by interconnected factors including extremism, weak governance systems, political problems and social exclusion. His remarks are important because they recognise that increasing the supply of weapons may strengthen operational capacity but cannot by itself eliminate the conditions that allow armed organisations and criminal networks to recruit, finance themselves and operate in vulnerable communities.

The minister therefore placed considerable emphasis on collaboration between defence institutions and universities. He argued that academic institutions should help government understand the human, political and economic dimensions of insecurity instead of leaving security policy entirely to soldiers and intelligence officers. Research can examine issues such as radicalisation, poverty, governance failures, resource competition, misinformation, border insecurity and community grievances, allowing policymakers to develop interventions that extend beyond military operations.

The newly commissioned security-management hub is intended to support that relationship. University of Ibadan Vice-Chancellor Prof. Kayode Adebowale said the facility should become a centre for multidisciplinary research and engagement between academics and policymakers rather than simply serve as a ceremonial building. He said the centre should generate data capable of assisting the Ministry of Defence and security agencies in formulating effective policies.

The Centre’s lead researcher and technical officer, Prof. Isaac Olawale Albert, similarly called for stronger government support and greater engagement by security agencies. His position reflects a longstanding concern within Nigerian academia that universities frequently conduct useful research on conflict and security but struggle to translate those findings into government policy because cooperation between researchers and operational institutions is inconsistent.

Musa’s remarks came as Nigeria’s military reported continued offensive operations across the country. Defence authorities said troops neutralised 217 terrorists and other criminals during October, rescued 349 kidnapped people and arrested 333 suspects. The military also reported the recovery of weapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition and said dozens of insurgents surrendered during operations conducted across different theatres. These figures are official military claims and do not independently establish the overall trajectory of insecurity, but they illustrate the scale and geographic spread of current security operations.

The Defence Minister said security conditions were gradually improving and argued that the government had intensified its response. At the same time, his admission that Nigeria struggles to secure sufficient ammunition and equipment reveals one of the logistical pressures confronting those operations. Military forces can increase troop deployments and launch offensives, but sustaining them requires a reliable supply of ammunition, spare parts, fuel, communications equipment and vehicles. When those supplies depend on foreign procurement systems vulnerable to global shortages, operational planning becomes more difficult.

The challenge is particularly significant for ammunition because it is consumed continuously during combat and training. Unlike major platforms such as aircraft or ships that may remain in service for decades, ammunition stocks must be replenished regularly. A military that cannot guarantee adequate domestic production may become vulnerable to shortages whenever international demand surges or shipping and procurement schedules are disrupted.

Armoured vehicles present another problem because modern security operations increasingly require protected mobility. Troops operating in areas affected by improvised explosive devices, ambushes and heavy gunfire depend on vehicles capable of protecting personnel while allowing rapid movement through hostile territory. Foreign dependence for such platforms can create delays not only in initial acquisition but also in spare parts, repairs and upgrades.

This is why defence-industrial development must extend beyond assembling equipment locally. Genuine strategic independence requires engineering capability, component production, maintenance infrastructure, research and development, testing facilities and reliable access to raw materials. A country that assembles imported components may still remain highly dependent if critical parts cannot be replaced without foreign suppliers.

Nigeria would therefore need a coordinated industrial policy if it intends to substantially reduce foreign dependence. Defence production can involve universities, engineering firms, metallurgical industries, electronics companies, software developers and specialised manufacturers. Military demand could potentially stimulate technological development in civilian industries as well, but only if procurement is transparent and domestic companies are held to strict technical and safety standards.

Quality control is particularly important because locally produced equipment cannot be accepted simply because it is Nigerian-made. Soldiers operating in combat environments depend on weapons and protective systems functioning reliably under extreme conditions. A defective rifle, ammunition batch or armoured vehicle can cost lives, meaning domestic production must meet rigorous military standards rather than be protected from scrutiny in the name of local content.

Corruption and procurement transparency are equally important. Nigeria’s defence sector has historically faced allegations of procurement irregularities, inflated contracts and poor accountability. Expanding domestic production without strong oversight could simply redirect existing procurement problems into local contracts. A credible defence-industrial strategy therefore needs transparent procurement procedures, independent auditing and clear performance requirements.

The economic implications could nevertheless be substantial. Defence manufacturing can create engineering, machining, electronics, software and technical jobs while retaining more procurement spending inside the domestic economy. Nigeria currently spends significant resources acquiring equipment abroad, and even partial localisation could create industrial opportunities if contracts are structured to develop genuine production capacity rather than superficial assembly operations.

Technology transfer will be critical. Musa’s proposal to connect Nigerian producers with established international manufacturers recognises that modern defence production requires specialised knowledge that can take decades to develop independently. Joint ventures can accelerate that process, but agreements must ensure that Nigerian companies actually gain technical capability instead of simply becoming sales agents or assembly partners for foreign firms.

The University of Ibadan event therefore brought together two strands of security policy that are often discussed separately: military industrialisation and intellectual research. Musa’s argument is that Nigeria needs both. Soldiers require dependable equipment and ammunition, but policymakers also require a deeper understanding of why insecurity emerges and persists. Weapons can defeat armed groups in specific engagements, while governance, economic opportunity, intelligence and community trust determine whether those groups can regenerate afterward.

His comments also challenge the assumption that the availability of money guarantees access to modern military equipment. In global defence markets, purchasing power competes with strategic alliances, production schedules and export restrictions. Major conflicts can redirect manufacturers toward governments placing enormous wartime orders, leaving countries outside those conflicts waiting longer for equipment. Musa’s warning is that Nigeria cannot build a national-security strategy around the assumption that foreign shelves will always be stocked when an emergency occurs.

The strategic argument for greater self-reliance is therefore straightforward, but achieving it will require years of consistent policy. Manufacturing ammunition at scale is easier than producing advanced fighter aircraft or sophisticated missile systems, meaning Nigeria would need to decide which capabilities are realistic priorities for domestic production and which should continue to be imported. Attempting to manufacture everything immediately could waste resources and reduce quality, while concentrating on selected strategic areas could provide greater security returns.

Small arms ammunition, protected vehicles, drones, surveillance equipment, communications systems, protective gear and maintenance components are among categories that many countries prioritise when developing domestic defence industries. Nigeria already has experience in several of these areas, but Musa’s remarks indicate that production needs to become much larger and more reliable if it is to meet operational demand.

The growth of unmanned systems also creates an opportunity for Nigerian technology companies. Modern warfare increasingly relies on drones for reconnaissance, surveillance and targeted operations, while inexpensive commercial technologies are being adapted rapidly for military use. Developing domestic expertise in these systems may be more achievable than attempting to reproduce every category of conventional military hardware.

Cybersecurity and artificial intelligence are similarly becoming important parts of national defence. Musa’s emphasis on technological innovation suggests that Nigeria’s security strategy cannot focus only on bullets and armoured vehicles. Intelligence analysis, satellite imagery, communications security, data processing and digital surveillance are increasingly essential in identifying armed groups before attacks occur.

Universities can contribute directly to those areas because they produce engineers, computer scientists, political researchers and security specialists. A well-funded research partnership between academia and defence institutions could help Nigeria develop technologies adapted to its own operating environment rather than relying entirely on imported systems designed for different conditions.

Musa also called on citizens to participate in security efforts by providing timely information to authorities. His “whole-of-nation” approach reflects the reality that security agencies often depend on local intelligence to identify suspicious movements, hideouts and logistical networks. Even the most heavily equipped military can struggle against irregular armed groups if communities are unwilling or afraid to provide information.

Trust therefore remains as important as firepower. Communities are more likely to cooperate with security agencies when they believe officers will protect them, respect human rights and act on information responsibly. Military success cannot be sustained if operations alienate the same population from whom intelligence is required.

The Defence Minister’s comments should consequently not be interpreted as claiming that foreign arms dependence is the sole cause of Nigeria’s insecurity. He identified it as one factor prolonging the conflict while explicitly acknowledging that extremism, governance failures, political conditions and social exclusion also contribute. This distinction matters because insecurity in Nigeria has multiple causes and varies significantly between regions.

What his remarks do reveal is a significant concern at the highest level of the Defence Ministry about the reliability of Nigeria’s military supply chain. A country of more than 200 million people confronting simultaneous security threats cannot afford repeated uncertainty over whether essential ammunition and equipment will be available when operations require them.

The commissioning of the CG Musa Security Management Hub therefore carried both symbolic and practical significance. It provided the Defence Minister with a platform to argue that Nigeria’s next phase of security reform must combine stronger domestic manufacturing with evidence-based policy, academic research and technological innovation.

The immediate security challenges will continue to be fought by troops already deployed across the country, but Musa’s argument is essentially about what Nigeria must build behind those forces. Without an industrial base capable of supporting operations and institutions capable of understanding the conflicts themselves, the country risks remaining dependent on emergency procurement and repeated military interventions.

Nigeria has spent years buying weapons to confront successive security crises. The Defence Minister is now arguing that the country must increasingly learn to manufacture what it needs, maintain what it deploys and generate the research required to understand what its forces are fighting.

Whether that ambition produces a genuinely stronger domestic defence industry will depend on investment, technology transfer, procurement reform and the willingness of government to maintain the strategy across political administrations. For now, Musa’s message is clear: Nigeria’s security cannot remain dependent on whether weapons and ammunition happen to be available in foreign markets when its troops need them most.