TEMA OIL REFINERY SAYS IT HAS RECEIVED OVER FIVE MILLION BARRELS OF CRUDE SINCE OPERATIONAL REVIVAL

Tema Oil Refinery says it has received more than five million barrels of crude oil since restarting its recovery programme, marking a significant change from 2024 when the state-owned refinery recorded no crude deliveries and was largely dependent on storage and related commercial activities rather than its core refining business. Managing Director Edmond Kombat disclosed the figure at the Government Accountability Series at Jubilee House on Monday, October 26, saying renewed confidence among suppliers and trading partners had enabled TOR to rebuild a regular crude supply chain after years of operational decline.

Kombat said the refinery had received several crude grades since May 2026, including Bonga, Baleine and Bonny Light, before beginning to process larger volumes of Ghanaian crude from the country’s own offshore fields. One of the most symbolically important deliveries was a cargo of Jubilee Medium Sweet crude transported aboard the MT Apache on July 15, 2026, which management said TOR paid for in full and which represented the refinery’s first Jubilee cargo in about a decade.

The refinery subsequently received approximately 950,000 barrels of Sankofa crude on September 25 from the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, further increasing the share of locally produced crude flowing through TOR. Kombat described the development as an important step toward linking Ghana’s upstream oil production more directly with domestic refining, arguing that crude produced offshore can generate additional value when processed inside the country rather than exported and replaced with imported finished petroleum products.

According to Kombat, the return of regular crude supply reflects a broader restoration of commercial confidence in TOR after a period in which suppliers were reluctant to provide feedstock to the refinery because of its financial problems, prolonged shutdowns and deteriorating plant condition. He said management now has crude deliveries planned for several months ahead, although the precise commercial terms, ownership structure and financing arrangements vary between individual cargoes.

The distinction between crude received and crude fully owned by TOR is important. Refineries can operate under several commercial arrangements, including outright crude purchases, tolling agreements and processing partnerships under which a trader or supplier retains ownership of the feedstock while paying the refinery to process it. The arrival of more than five million barrels therefore demonstrates increased physical activity at TOR, but it should not automatically be interpreted as meaning TOR purchased all five million barrels using its own balance sheet.

Management’s figure should also be distinguished from independently audited refinery throughput. Kombat disclosed the crude-receipt total as part of the Government Accountability Series, but the specific cumulative figure of more than five million barrels has not been independently audited in the reports reviewed by VNTV. The figure therefore remains a management disclosure, although individual cargoes and TOR’s broader operational restart are supported by multiple official and media reports.

The refinery’s return to crude processing began after major turnaround maintenance on its Crude Distillation Unit, which had been inactive for years. TOR said the maintenance programme ran from August 1 to October 30, 2025 and was followed by regulatory inspections from the National Petroleum Authority. The refinery formally resumed crude oil refining operations on December 19, 2025 after receiving regulatory clearance.

At the time of that restart, TOR said its Crude Distillation Unit was operating at approximately 28,000 barrels per stream day. The plant was originally designed for that capacity before being revamped to a nominal 45,000 barrels per stream day, and management has been working to restore the higher level through equipment rehabilitation, including installation of the F-61 furnace.

TOR’s own technical information states that its Crude Distillation Unit can process up to 45,000 barrels per stream day when fully configured, while management has discussed further optimisation toward 60,000 barrels per stream day in the medium term. The refinery also operates a Residue Fluid Catalytic Cracking unit designed to process about 14,000 barrels per stream day, although that secondary unit has faced a longer period of inactivity and requires additional rehabilitation.

The return of crude deliveries is therefore only one part of TOR’s broader recovery. Feedstock is essential because even a mechanically sound refinery cannot operate without a reliable supply of crude, but sustained refining also depends on plant reliability, working capital, storage, product offtake, maintenance, energy supply and the ability to meet fuel-quality specifications.

Kombat said the refinery’s position had been dramatically different when the current management assumed office in May 2025. According to figures he presented Monday, TOR had accumulated losses of roughly GH¢10 billion and debt of more than US$500 million, while key processing units had been out of service for years. The Crude Distillation Unit had reportedly been inactive since April 2021, while the Residue Fluid Catalytic Cracking unit had been shut down since 2019.

That meant TOR was no longer functioning primarily as a refinery despite possessing one of Ghana’s most important downstream petroleum assets. Instead, much of its commercial activity had shifted toward renting storage capacity and providing terminal services to petroleum companies.

The state of the refinery had become a recurring national policy issue because Ghana continued importing large volumes of finished petroleum products while its own major state-owned refinery remained substantially idle. Successive governments announced plans to rehabilitate TOR, find strategic partners or restructure the company, but repeated financial and technical setbacks delayed a sustainable return to full refining.

The current management’s strategy has focused first on restoring the Crude Distillation Unit, bringing outstanding financial reporting up to date, strengthening commercial relationships and securing regular feedstock before attempting larger expansion projects.

That approach appears to have produced a measurable improvement in physical operations. Kombat said TOR moved from receiving no crude in 2024 to maintaining a more regular stream of cargoes in 2026, with additional deliveries expected over the coming six months.

Citi Newsroom separately reported Kombat as saying that TOR had already received five million barrels and had crude “lined up every month” for the next six months. That statement indicates management is trying to move the refinery away from sporadic cargoes toward continuous operation, which is essential for refinery economics because frequent shutdowns and restarts can significantly increase costs and reduce efficiency.

The specific crude grades listed by Kombat also demonstrate TOR’s efforts to diversify feedstock. Bonga and Bonny Light are Nigerian light sweet crudes commonly used by refineries because of their relatively low sulfur content and strong yields of valuable transport fuels. Baleine crude originates from Côte d’Ivoire, while Jubilee and Sankofa are produced from Ghana’s own offshore petroleum fields.

The use of Ghanaian crude has particular political and economic significance. Ghana has produced oil commercially since 2010, yet most of its crude has historically been exported while refined fuels continue to be imported to meet domestic demand. That structure means Ghana simultaneously operates as a crude exporter and a large importer of gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel and other finished petroleum products.

Refining part of the country’s domestic crude locally can potentially retain more value within Ghana by supporting refinery employment, engineering services, logistics, storage and downstream distribution. It can also reduce some exposure to imported refined-product markets, although the precise foreign-exchange benefit depends on the commercial arrangements under which TOR acquires and processes the crude.

A refinery does not automatically eliminate the need for imports. Product yields vary depending on crude quality and plant configuration, and TOR cannot currently supply all of Ghana’s fuel needs. Even when operating, the refinery produces a mix of LPG, naphtha, kerosene, aviation turbine kerosene, diesel and residual fuel oil, while market demand for each product may differ from the refinery’s output profile.

The National Petroleum Authority has said TOR and the privately owned Sentuo Oil Refinery together could eventually meet a significant share of domestic petroleum demand if both operate reliably. That could reduce dependence on imported finished fuels, but Ghana would still require imports unless total refining output and product mix fully match national consumption.

TOR itself has historically estimated that it can meet about 35 percent of Ghana’s petroleum-product demand when operating at effective capacity. That figure varies with market growth and plant utilisation, but it illustrates why restarting TOR is strategically important without implying that the refinery alone can make Ghana self-sufficient.

Management is also pursuing expansion. President John Dramani Mahama has discussed plans to increase TOR’s processing capability, while the refinery’s own strategy includes restoring existing capacity and eventually moving toward much larger refining volumes. Such expansion would require significant capital and would need to be economically justified against competing private refining capacity and regional fuel markets.

The immediate challenge is sustaining the current recovery rather than simply announcing future expansion.

TOR has a history of repeated restarts followed by shutdowns caused by inadequate maintenance, lack of crude, debt or working-capital shortages. A credible turnaround will therefore be judged not simply by how many barrels have arrived over a few months but by whether the refinery can continue operating over several years without returning to long periods of inactivity.

The return of suppliers is one positive indicator because refinery operations require confidence that TOR can fulfil payment obligations and honour commercial contracts. Kombat said business partners who had previously been reluctant to deal with the refinery were once again willing to supply crude and enter processing arrangements.

The Jubilee cargo is particularly relevant in that respect. Management said TOR purchased the cargo through an arrangement involving Vitol and paid for it fully. If confirmed across the refinery’s broader commercial portfolio, the ability to finance or settle crude purchases would represent an improvement from periods when debt and weak cash flow undermined supplier confidence.

The Sankofa delivery also demonstrates cooperation between two state-linked petroleum institutions. GNPC holds Ghana’s interests in upstream petroleum production, while TOR is responsible for downstream refining. Directing part of the state’s crude entitlement into domestic refining could create a more integrated petroleum value chain if the commercial terms are transparent and economically sound.

Kombat has repeatedly argued that Ghana should capture more value from its own petroleum resources by linking upstream production with domestic refining and distribution. The principle is straightforward: rather than exporting crude and later importing finished products, some portion of Ghana’s oil could be refined domestically.

The economics, however, depend on refinery efficiency. If local refining costs substantially more than importing finished products, processing domestic crude purely for nationalistic reasons could impose additional costs on consumers or taxpayers. TOR’s rehabilitation therefore needs to improve efficiency sufficiently for domestic refining to remain commercially competitive.

That requires reliable equipment, high utilisation rates and careful selection of crude grades compatible with the refinery’s configuration.

TOR’s Crude Distillation Unit is primarily a hydroskimming plant. It separates crude into different fractions, producing LPG, naphtha, kerosene, aviation fuel, diesel and residual fuel oil. More complex conversion units can further process lower-value residue into higher-value gasoline and other fuels, which is why rehabilitation of TOR’s Residue Fluid Catalytic Cracking unit remains important to the refinery’s long-term profitability.

The RFCC was designed to process heavy residue that would otherwise have lower commercial value. Bringing that unit back into reliable operation could improve TOR’s product yields and margins, but rehabilitation is technically demanding and capital intensive.

The refinery must also comply with increasingly stringent fuel-quality standards. Ghana and other African countries are moving toward lower-sulfur fuels to reduce air pollution, requiring refineries to invest in additional treatment technology.

TOR’s current configuration therefore needs not only restoration but modernization if it is to remain competitive over the longer term.

The reported five-million-barrel supply milestone should consequently be seen as an important operational indicator rather than proof that every part of the refinery has completed its turnaround.

Financial recovery is equally important. Kombat said Monday that TOR recorded a profit before tax of GH¢1.24 billion in 2025, which the State Interests and Governance Authority has described as the refinery’s first profit in roughly a decade. Audited accounts presented to SIGA support that 2025 profitability figure.

Management also says TOR has reduced certain liabilities and improved financial reporting. The refinery cleared a backlog of audited accounts covering 2019 through 2024 by April 30, 2026, completed its 2025 accounts the following month and subsequently presented seven audited financial reports to SIGA.

Those steps matter because years without audited financial statements made it difficult for government, creditors and potential partners to assess TOR’s true financial condition.

The refinery remains heavily indebted despite the improvement. Kombat said management inherited more than US$500 million in debt, significant unpaid obligations to government agencies and utilities and substantial liabilities to staff and retirees. TOR therefore remains a financially stressed company even while reporting improving operating performance.

Management has been pursuing debt restructuring, including discussions over legacy obligations to the government and other creditors. Until those liabilities are addressed, they will continue affecting TOR’s balance sheet and its ability to finance investment without state support.

The government therefore faces a delicate policy question. TOR is a strategically important national asset, but repeatedly injecting public money into an inefficient refinery would create a significant fiscal burden. The objective must be to establish a commercial model capable of keeping the refinery operating without recurring taxpayer bailouts.

Tolling arrangements could form part of that model. Under tolling, an external trader supplies crude and TOR earns a processing fee rather than carrying the full financial burden of purchasing the feedstock. This reduces working-capital requirements and can keep the plant utilised while management rebuilds its balance sheet.

The trade-off is that the economic benefit to TOR and Ghana may be smaller than under profitable crude ownership because the trader retains part of the commercial value. The optimal structure may therefore involve a combination of tolling, direct purchases and processing of Ghana’s state crude entitlement.

Transparency around those arrangements will be important. The public needs to know whether individual cargoes are owned by TOR, GNPC, private traders or other partners because that determines who bears the financial risk and who captures the refining margin.

The Government Accountability Series disclosures provide useful headline figures, but more detailed operational reporting would allow independent assessment of TOR’s recovery.

Important metrics include barrels actually processed rather than merely received, utilisation rates, refinery yields, operating margins, plant downtime, crude acquisition costs and the volume of finished petroleum products sold into the Ghanaian market.

Management’s reported five-million-barrel figure is significant, but receipt alone does not establish how much of that crude has already been processed.

Some cargo may remain in storage, while some may have been processed under commercial arrangements whose economic benefit depends on tolling fees or product-sharing agreements.

That distinction is especially important when evaluating claims that TOR will reduce Ghana’s foreign-exchange expenditure.

If Ghana imports a crude cargo and pays for it in dollars, refining that cargo locally does not eliminate the foreign-exchange cost of the crude itself. The potential savings come from capturing refining margins domestically, reducing freight and product-import costs and, in the case of Ghanaian crude, retaining more value within the domestic petroleum chain.

The greatest foreign-exchange benefit could come from processing crude already produced in Ghana, particularly the state’s entitlement, provided the refinery operates efficiently.

Ghana produces tens of millions of barrels of oil annually from fields including Jubilee, TEN and Sankofa. Kombat said roughly two million barrels of the crude processed during TOR’s recovery had come from domestic fields, with the balance supplied externally.

That means local crude is becoming a meaningful part of the refinery’s feedstock but does not yet account for the entire volume.

The use of Jubilee and Sankofa crude also addresses earlier technical debate over whether TOR could process Ghana’s indigenous crude grades. Officials had previously raised questions about the refinery’s configuration, but TOR maintained that its equipment could handle light sweet crude from Ghana’s offshore fields.

The successful receipt and processing of Jubilee crude strengthened management’s argument, while the subsequent Sankofa shipment suggests local crude will remain part of the refinery’s supply strategy.

Still, different crude streams have different characteristics, and refinery optimisation requires detailed technical analysis of each grade.

Another important factor is storage capacity. TOR has significant crude and product tanks, allowing it to hold feedstock and finished fuels. Storage has historically provided revenue even when refining units were inactive.

A functioning refinery can combine those storage assets with processing and terminal operations, potentially giving TOR a more diversified commercial model.

Management says product-storage volumes have also increased sharply during the recovery period, indicating stronger use of the company’s infrastructure beyond the crude units.

That matters because a refinery’s viability depends on more than the margin earned from processing oil. Storage, loading, blending, terminal services and logistics can all generate revenue.

TOR’s revival could also have implications for Ghana’s fuel pricing.

Imported finished petroleum products include refining margins and international shipping costs before they reach Ghana. Domestic refining could reduce some of those components, but any effect on pump prices would depend on crude prices, refinery efficiency, taxes, levies, distribution margins and the pricing formula used by the National Petroleum Authority.

Consumers should therefore not assume that every increase in TOR output will automatically produce a dramatic reduction in petrol or diesel prices.

The refinery can improve supply security even if price effects are modest. Having domestic processing capacity gives Ghana another source of finished products when international shipping is disrupted or global product markets tighten.

Recent geopolitical events have demonstrated the vulnerability of international energy supply chains. A domestically operating refinery cannot shield Ghana from global crude prices, but it can reduce dependence on imported finished fuel and provide additional flexibility during disruptions.

Employment is another dimension of the revival. Kombat said TOR’s rehabilitation and operational recovery had created more than 1,600 direct permanent and temporary jobs, including engineers, maintenance workers and staff employed through local contractors.

Those employment figures were also management disclosures, but they illustrate the broader economic effects of restoring an industrial facility that had been substantially inactive.

Refinery rehabilitation requires welders, engineers, technicians, electricians, safety personnel, construction contractors and logistics workers, while continuous operation creates more stable long-term employment.

TOR’s recovery has also included changes to employee conditions. Kombat said workers received a 30 percent salary increase after going about a decade without an adjustment, following negotiations with labour unions.

Management argues that improved staff morale is essential to maintaining operational discipline and retaining skilled technical personnel.

That becomes especially important in a refinery where experienced engineers and operators understand equipment that has been in use for decades.

Safety remains another critical consideration.

Oil refining involves high temperatures, pressure systems and flammable materials, making plant integrity and maintenance essential. Restarting equipment after years of inactivity requires rigorous inspection and testing, which is why the NPA’s regulatory clearance was an important part of TOR’s December 2025 restart.

The refinery will need continued inspections as throughput increases and more equipment returns to service.

A serious industrial accident could reverse confidence quickly, making safety performance one of the most important indicators of whether the recovery is sustainable.

Environmental performance will also matter. Refining generates emissions, wastewater and industrial waste that require proper treatment, while older equipment can face greater challenges meeting modern environmental standards.

Future investment will therefore need to focus not only on production capacity but also on emissions control, energy efficiency and fuel quality.

Government has discussed much larger ambitions for TOR, including an eventual expansion toward 100,000 barrels per day or development of additional refining capacity.

Those plans would transform Ghana’s downstream petroleum market if financed and completed, but they remain separate from the present recovery of the existing refinery.

Expansion would require hundreds of millions or potentially billions of dollars depending on the design, and investors would need clarity on feedstock, product markets, ownership and regulatory policy.

For now, getting the existing 45,000-barrel-per-day nameplate plant operating reliably represents the more immediate challenge.

At a sustained 45,000 barrels per day, five million barrels would be equivalent to roughly 111 days of full-capacity CDU processing. At 28,000 barrels per day, the same quantity represents roughly 179 days of processing. These simple comparisons illustrate that the reported crude receipts are substantial relative to TOR’s current operating scale, but actual processing schedules may differ because plants do not necessarily operate continuously at nameplate capacity.

That is why future reporting should distinguish cumulative crude receipts from throughput and utilisation.

The recovery will become more convincing if management regularly publishes operating data showing how much crude entered the refinery, how much was processed and how much product emerged.

Such transparency would also help policymakers measure TOR’s contribution to Ghana’s national fuel supply.

The state-owned refinery has been the subject of decades of political debate, with successive administrations alternately promising rehabilitation, private-sector partnerships or structural reform.

A sustainable restart could therefore represent a significant industrial achievement, but only if the refinery avoids returning to the cycle of debt, shutdown and emergency rehabilitation that has characterised much of its recent history.

Kombat’s five-million-barrel announcement indicates progress on one of the most persistent problems: obtaining enough crude to keep the refinery running.

Management says suppliers are returning, Ghanaian crude is entering the plant and future cargoes are already scheduled.

The next test is whether those commercial relationships translate into continuous refining and positive cash flow.

The reported GH¢1.24 billion profit before tax for 2025 provides evidence of improved finances, but the refinery’s remaining liabilities mean one profitable year cannot by itself establish long-term viability.

Likewise, clearing the audit backlog improves governance but does not eliminate legacy debt.

The refinery’s condition must therefore be assessed across several dimensions at once: plant reliability, feedstock supply, profitability, debt management, safety and product competitiveness.

On feedstock, the improvement is clear compared with 2024.

According to management, TOR received no crude at all during that year. By 2026, it had received Bonga, Baleine, Bonny Light, Jubilee and Sankofa crude, taking cumulative receipts beyond five million barrels.

That is a significant operational shift.

The Jubilee delivery also carries broader national significance because it demonstrates Ghanaian crude being processed by Ghanaian engineers in a state-owned Ghanaian refinery.

Kombat has repeatedly highlighted that point as evidence that different parts of the country’s petroleum industry can be connected more effectively.

But symbolism cannot substitute for commercial performance.

To generate lasting value, the refinery must process crude efficiently, produce fuels that meet market standards and sell them at prices competitive with imports.

That means the success of the five-million-barrel milestone will ultimately be measured not by the number itself but by what TOR produces from those barrels and how much economic value remains in Ghana.

Independent verification will also matter.

Although TOR’s audited 2025 financial statements have been completed and its reported GH¢1.24 billion profit has been referenced by SIGA, the specific more-than-five-million-barrel crude-receipt figure was disclosed by management during Monday’s public accountability presentation and was not accompanied in the reports reviewed by VNTV by a separate independent audit of cumulative 2026 cargo volumes.

That does not make the figure unreliable, but it means it should be presented as TOR management’s account rather than an independently audited national statistic.

The distinction is particularly important in a sector where cargo volumes and commercial terms can represent hundreds of millions of dollars.

Detailed disclosure of individual shipments, counterparties and processing arrangements would strengthen public confidence and allow more informed assessment of the refinery’s performance.

The current evidence nevertheless supports the broader conclusion that TOR is operating at a materially higher level than during its prolonged period of inactivity.

The refinery resumed crude processing in December 2025, the NPA confirmed its regulatory restart, management has documented multiple cargoes during 2026 and Ghanaian crude is now among the feedstock entering the facility.

Those are concrete operational developments.

The refinery’s continued recovery could have wider implications for Ghana’s industrial policy because TOR remains one of the country’s largest heavy industrial assets.

A stable refinery can support petrochemical development, engineering skills, port activity and downstream distribution while giving Ghana greater control over part of its fuel supply chain.

Failure would have the opposite effect, leaving the country with another costly state asset requiring repeated public intervention.

The stakes are therefore much larger than the five-million-barrel milestone alone.

For now, TOR management is presenting the crude deliveries as evidence that confidence has returned after years in which suppliers and business partners were reluctant to engage with the refinery.

Kombat says additional cargoes are scheduled monthly, indicating that management expects the crude supply chain to remain active into 2027.

Whether that schedule is maintained will be one of the key indicators to watch.

Another will be progress on the RFCC, because restoring secondary conversion capacity would improve the refinery’s ability to turn lower-value residue into higher-value petroleum products.

The third will be how quickly TOR reduces its legacy debt and negative equity.

If crude continues arriving but debt remains unsustainable, the operational revival could still face financial constraints.

If financial restructuring progresses while plant reliability improves, TOR could move closer to functioning as a commercially viable refinery rather than a periodically revived state project.

That is ultimately the standard against which the Government Accountability Series claims should be judged.

Monday’s announcement confirms that TOR has moved far beyond its 2024 position when it received no crude at all.

It does not yet prove that the refinery’s long-term problems have been solved.

What it does show is that crude is once again flowing into Tema in significant volumes, Ghanaian oil is being processed domestically and management has restored commercial relationships that were effectively dormant during the refinery’s worst years.

The coming months will determine whether that momentum can become a stable operating model.

If TOR can continue receiving crude every month, process those barrels reliably, restore its full existing capacity and control its debt, the five-million-barrel milestone may eventually be remembered as part of a genuine industrial turnaround.

If the refinery again encounters feedstock, maintenance or financing problems, it could become another temporary recovery in a long history of interrupted operations.

For now, the most defensible conclusion is narrower but still significant: Tema Oil Refinery says it has received more than five million barrels of crude during its operational recovery, including Jubilee and Sankofa crude produced in Ghana, after receiving no crude deliveries in 2024. The claim marks a substantial improvement in feedstock availability, but the cumulative five-million-barrel figure remains a management disclosure and should be assessed alongside future audited operational data on actual processing, output and commercial performance.